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ABSTRACT
A large-scale Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) model of the global economy is
used to investigate the determinants of the Great Moderation and the transition to the Great
Recession (1986–2010). Beside the global-economy perspective, the model presents the novel
feature of a broad range of included financial variables and risk factor measures. The results point
to various mechanisms related to the global monetary policy stance (Great Deviation), financial
institutions’ risk-taking behaviour (Great Leveraging) and global imbalances (savings glut), deter-
mining aggregate fluctuations. Finally, an out-of-sample forecasting exercise provides evidence
against the ‘end of the Great Moderation’ view, showing that the timing, though not the
dimension of the Great Recession episode (2008–2010), was predictable on the basis of the
same macroeconomic mechanisms at work over the two previous decades.
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I. Introduction
A generalized dampening in macroeconomic fluc-
tuations has been observed since the mid-1980s in
the U.S. and major industrialized countries. This
‘Great Moderation’ phenomenon (Stock and
Watson 2003, 2005) persisted for more than two
decades despite various episodes of economic, finan-
cial and political distress, until the eruption of the
sub-prime financial crisis in 2007, the oil price shock
in 2008 and the ensuing global Great Recession. The
causes of the Great Moderation have been debated in
depth in the literature. One prominent view attri-
butes the greater macroeconomic stability to ‘good
luck’ in the form of smaller shocks hitting the econ-
omy (Stock and Watson 2003; Ahmed, Levin, and
Wilson 2004; Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian 2007;
Kim, Morley, and Piger 2008; Canova 2009). Other
contributions focus on the role of better monetary
policy in reducing aggregate volatility (Clarida, Gal,
and Gertler 2000), shifting the economy away from
indeterminacy and leading to an environment of
price stability (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004;
Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2011). Finally, several
sources of structural change, potentially responsible
for declining output volatility, have been explored,
such as (i) improved inventory management through
the intensive adoption of information technology
(McConnell and Pérez-Quiros, 2000; Davis and
Kahn 2008); (ii) the expansion of the tertiary sector
and contraction of energy-related and heavy indus-
try sectors (Carvalho and Gabaix 2013); (iii) the
decline in aggregate consumption and investment
volatility due to the dominance of permanent tech-
nological shocks (Blanchard and Simon 2001); (iv)
changes in the correlation between productivity and
hours (Gal and Gambetti 2009); (v) lower sensitivity
of aggregate expenditure to current income and
interest rates due to financial innovation (Dynan,
Elmendorf, and Sichel 2006).
More recently, the remarkable widening in
macroeconomic fluctuations due to the onset of the
Great Recession raised the issue of the end of the
Great Moderation. While some contributions argue
in favour of a shift to a new regime of higher macro-
economic uncertainty following the financial crisis
(Barnett and Chauvet 2008; Cannarella et al., 2010;
Bean 2010; Taylor 2011; Keating and Valcarcel 2012;
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Ng and Tambalotti 2012; Ng and Wright 2013),
other evidence suggests that the Great Moderation
might not be over. Stock and Watson (2012) and
Gadea, Gomez-Loscos and Pérez-Quiros (2014) do
not detect any structural change in the volatility and
in other properties of the U.S. business cycle in the
aftermath of the Great Recession. Chen (2011)
points to a reversion towards a low-volatility regime
in the G7 countries already occurring about the end
of 2009. International evidence of a purely tempor-
ary change in the GDP growth rate is also detected
by Charles, Darné and Ferrara (2014). Larger oil
price and financial disturbances (‘bad luck’) would
then be at the root of the rise in macroeconomic
uncertainty caused by the financial crisis, driving the
transition from the Great Moderation to the Great
Recession (Clark 2009). Also the most recent data,
though not yet thoroughly researched, seem to sug-
gest a return to a reduced volatility macroeconomic
regime (Furman 2014).
In light of the above evidence, this article takes the
perspective that the Great Moderation and Great
Recession share an important global dimension and
are tightly interrelated phenomena, with the purpose
of getting a clear understanding of their main under-
lying driving forces and the features of the transition
from a period of relatively subdued fluctuations to an
episode of remarkably higher macroeconomic volatility.
To this aim, we employ an econometric approach
with two novel features. First, rather than carrying
out a country-by-country analysis, as in most pre-
vious studies, we adopt a global-economy frame-
work. A large-scale, Factor-Augmented Vector
Autoregressive (FAVAR) econometric model, cover-
ing 50 OECD and emerging economies, is used to
investigate global energy, goods, labour, monetary
and financial asset market conditions. In addition
to providing a global perspective, the large-scale
framework also grants the benefits of more accurate
estimation of structural disturbances, overcoming
the potential drawbacks of model misspecification
and inconsistent estimation of shocks affecting
small-scale VAR models (Giannone, Lenza, and
Reichlin 2008). Second, we include in the model a
large set of financial variables, allowing for identifi-
cation of a broad range of structural disturbances
related to financial markets, and a comprehensive
array of risk factor indicators, meant to capture
investors’ expectations and sentiments about the
state of the business cycle.
Our findings point to several structural supply-side,
demand-side and financial shocks as the main driving
forces of macro-financial fluctuations over the Great
Moderation and the transition to the financial crisis
and the Great Recession, related to various mechanisms
already documented in the literature. For example, the
early 2000s might have witnessed the setting in of a new
international monetary regime based on a ‘Great
Deviation’ (Taylor 2010, 2013; Hofmann and
Bogdanova 2012), as the monetary policy stance turned
(over-)accommodative in many industrialized and
emerging countries, following the sequence of interest
rate cuts implemented by the U.S. Fed to contrast the
recessionary effects of the dot-com bubble, the ensuing
jobless recovery and deflationary expectations. The nar-
rative tells that the Great Deviation originated in the U.
S., spilled over internationally through the attempt of
foreign central banks to resist unwanted fluctuations in
exchange rates and capital flows, by keeping interest
rates low in the face of the U.S. Fed’s expansionary
policy. Moreover, the destabilizing effects of buoyant
liquidity were amplified by excessive risk-taking of
financial intermediaries, giving rise to the ‘Great
Leveraging’ phenomenon (Taylor 2012), boosted by
financial deregulation and innovation (Taylor 2010;
Kahn 2010; Bernanke 2010; Dagher and Fu 2011) and
misled risk perceptions (Lettau, Ludvigson, and
Watcher 2008). An alternative explanation, the ‘savings
glut’ hypothesis (Bernanke 2005), points to foreign fac-
tors, rather than Fed’s policy, as the main forces driving
downward the U.S. real interest rates and deteriorating
the U.S. current account deficit. Financial crises in
emerging (especially East Asian) countries during the
1990s led their central banks to build up foreign
exchange reserves and to convey national savings to
international capital markets. As the Great Deviation
hypothesis, also the savings glut view highlights the fact
that the transition to the Great Recession occurred in an
environment of too low real interest rates, originating a
sequence of asset price misalignments involving initially
bonds, stocks and house prices, and then oil and non-
energy commodity prices (Caballero, Farhi, and
Gourinchas 2008a; Caballero and Fahri 2014). As the
bust phase of the financial cycle set in, deteriorating
balance sheets forced financial institutions into delever-
aging and fire sales of assets, triggering a contraction in
2 F. C. BAGLIANO AND C. MORANA
domestic and external demand through a credit crunch
and worsening expectations about future credit supply
and higher precautionary savings due to mounting
uncertainty about the resilience of the international
financial system (Adrian and Shin 2010; Bean 2010;
Bagliano and Morana 2012; Morana 2013).
Our results provide insights on the relevance of
those mechanisms for the global economy in the
period leading to the Great Recession. To preview,
global macro-financial dynamics over the 1986–2010
period are due to a composite set of structural dis-
turbances coming from all (supply-side, demand-
side and financial) sources. Some of those shocks
displayed increased volatility well before the onset
of the Great Recession, which is better interpreted as
the final outcome of an ongoing process, in accord
with the account provided by Caballero, Farhi and
Gourinchas (2008b). The savings glut, Great
Deviation and Great Leveraging hypotheses are
then complementary explanations of the transition
dynamics leading to the Great Recession.
Peculiar to the Great Recession was then the much
larger magnitude of shocks rather than their source, and
the size of the global real activity contraction, which was
(on average per quarter) four times larger than during
the previous three episodes. Demand-side and financial
shocks account for about two-thirds of the global output
contraction during the Great Recession, consistent with
the narrative pointing to the real effects of the sub-prime
financial crisis working mainly through aggregate
demand shortages, due to a credit crunch, an increased
level of uncertainty and larger precautionary savings.
Coherently, by means of an out-of-sample forecasting
exercise, we provide evidence of predictability of the
timing of the Great Recession, yet not of its depth.
Our results finally cast some doubts on a purely
structural explanation of the ‘jobless recovery’ phenom-
enon. In fact, demand-side and financial shocks, in
addition to accounting for as much as cyclical employ-
ment variance than supply-side disturbances over the
whole sample, had an even larger slowing down effect in
the year following the end of the Great Recession.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the econometric methodology is outlined,
and details on the identification and economic inter-
pretation of structural shocks are provided. Section 3
presents and discusses results concerning the struc-
tural sources of macro-financial fluctuations over the
Great Moderation and the transition to the Great
Recession. The predictability of the timing and depth
of the Great Recession is investigated in Section 4
and conclusions are drawn in Section 5.1
II. Econometric methodology
The empirical analysis is cast in terms of a FAVAR
econometric model composed of two blocks of equa-
tions. The former, the global-economy model, describes
the dynamics of a broad range of macroeconomic,
financial and oil market global factors. The second
block, the local-economiesmodel, captures the dynamics
of themainmacroeconomic and financial variables for a
large set of developed and emerging economies, and is
used to estimate the unobserved global macro-financial
factors.
The econometric model
The global-economy model contains unobserved (F1;t)
and observed (F2;t) globalmacro-financial factors and oil
market demand and supply side variables (Ot), collected
in a R 1 vector Ft ¼ F01;t F
0
2;tO
0
t
h i0
. The local-econo-
mies model refers to Q macro-financial variables for M
countries, collected in a N  1 vector Zt (with
N ¼ M  Q). The joint dynamics of the global and
local macro-financial blocks are then modelled by
means of the following stationary reduced form
dynamic factor model
ðI PðLÞÞðFt  κÞ ¼ ηt (1)
ðI CðLÞÞ Zt  μð Þ  Λ Ft  κð Þð Þ ¼ vt; (2)
where ðFt  κÞ; ðZt  μÞ,Ið0Þ, μ and κ are vectors
of intercept components of dimension N  1 and
R 1, respectively, with R  N, and the contempora-
neous effects of the global factors in Ft on each country’s
variables in Zt are measured by the loading coefficients
collected in the N  R matrix Λ ¼ Λ 0F1 Λ
0
F2 Λ
0
O
h i0
.
1A Supplementary Appendix, available online with the working paper version of this article at http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.424.pdf,
provides additional information on the data set, the estimation methods, the identification of structural disturbances and further results.
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Global factor dynamics are described by the station-
ary finite-order polynomial matrix PðLÞ;P1Lþ
P2L2 þ :::þ PpLp, where Pj (j ¼ 1; :::p) is a square
matrix of coefficients of order R, whereas dynamics in
the local-economies variables are captured by
CðLÞ;C1Lþ C2L2 þ :::þ CcLc, where Cj (j ¼ 0; ::c)
is a square block (own-country) diagonal matrix of
coefficients of order N. Finally, ηt,i.i.d.ð0;ΣηÞ is a R
1 vector of reduced form global shocks driving the Ft
factors, and vt, i.i.d.ð0;ΣvÞ is the N  1 vector of
reduced form country-specific disturbances, with
E ηjtvis
h i
¼ 0 for all i; j; t; s.
The chosen specification of (1) and (2) embeds
important assumptions on the structure of global
and local linkages: (i) global shocks (ηt) affect both
the global and local economies through PðLÞ and the
factor-loading matrix Λ, respectively; (ii) country-
specific disturbances (vt) do not affect the global
economy, limiting their impact only to the country
of origin, due to the assumed block (own-country)
diagonal structure for CðLÞ.
Consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of
the coefficients in (1) and (2) are obtained by means of
the procedures proposed inMorana (2012, 2014), yield-
ing accurate estimation also in small samples (see the
Monte Carlo evidence reported therein). Such proce-
dures involve the iterative estimation of the unobserved
factors and the local-economies model, followed by the
estimation of the global-economymodel conditional on
the estimated unobserved factors.
Given the specification of (1) and (2), the distur-
bances of the global-economy model in ηt have the
nature of reduced form innovations. In order to
investigate the role of underlying structural shocks
in shaping global factor dynamics it is then necessary
to adopt an identification scheme. To this aim, we
impose a set of exclusion restrictions on the contem-
poraneous (within quarter) responses of the factors to
the structural disturbances, resulting in a precise
‘ordering’ (discussed below) for the elements of Ft.
The structural vector moving average representation
for the global model (1) can then be written as
Ft  κð Þ ¼ HFðLÞK1t; (3)
where HFðLÞ ¼ I PðLÞ½ 1, and t ¼ Kηt is the
vector of the R structural shocks driving the common
factors in Ft, withK being a R R invertible matrix. By
assumption, the structural factor shocks are orthogonal
and have unit variance, so that E t
0
t
  ¼ KΣηK0 ¼ IR.
To achieve exact identification of the structural distur-
bances, additional RðR 1Þ=2 restrictions are needed.
Since ηt ¼ K1t, imposing exclusion restrictions on
the contemporaneous impactmatrix amounts to impos-
ing zero restrictions on the elements ofK1, for which a
lower triangular structure is assumed. Operationally,
K1 (with the restrictions necessary for exact identifica-
tion imposed) is estimated by the Choleski decomposi-
tion of the factor innovation variance–covariance
matrix Ση, that is, K^
1 ¼ cholðΣ^ηÞ. Forecast error var-
iance and historical decompositions are then derived
using standard formulas. Following the thick modelling
strategy of Granger and Jeon (2004), median estimates
of the parameters of interest, impulse responses, forecast
error variance and historical decompositions, as well as
their confidence intervals, are obtained by means of
simulation.
Specification of the global model
In the current application, the global-economy
model (1) counts 33 endogenous variables, collected
in vector Ft ¼ F01;t F
0
2;tO
0
t
h i0
over the period 1986:1
through 2010:3. F1;t contains 12 unobserved global
factors estimated by means of the local-economies
block (2) using a own-country diagonal dynamic
structure of the first order, as suggested by the BIC
information criterion. The local block counts over
800 equations and contains macroeconomic and
financial data for 50 countries.2 Each unobserved
global macro-financial factor is estimated as the
first principal component (PC) extracted from a
subset of cross-country, homogeneous variables in
the local-economies model. In particular, global
2The countries are: 31 advanced economies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the U.K., the U.S.), 5 advanced emerging economies (Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa) and 14 secondary
emerging economies (Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey). Main
data sources are: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, FRED2 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis); OECD and BIS (unofficial) house
price data sets and International Energy Agency (IEA-OECD) data sets.
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macroeconomic and financial conditions are cap-
tured by a real activity growth factor (Y) extracted
from real GDP, private consumption and investment
growth series; an employment growth factor (E) from
the civilian employment growth series; an unemploy-
ment rate change factor (U) from changes in the
unemployment rate series; a real wage growth factor
(W) from the real wage growth variables; a fiscal
policy stance factor (G), capturing excess public con-
sumption growth, from changes in the ratio of pub-
lic expenditures to GDP; a global US$ exchange rate
return index (X) obtained from the bilateral
exchange rate returns against the US$; a core infla-
tion (nominal) factor (N) extracted from changes in
the series for inflation, nominal money growth rates,
short- and long-term interest rates; a global excess
liquidity growth index (L) from changes in the M3
(or M2) to GDP ratio and the private loans to GDP
ratio series; a real stock market return factor (F) from
the real stock market price index return series; a real
housing return factor (H) from the real housing price
index return series; a real short-term rate factor (SR)
obtained from changes in real short-term interest
rates and a term spread factor (TS) extracted from
changes in the term spread series.
F2;t contains 11 observed factors, added to capture
several sources of financial disturbances and fundamen-
tal imbalances with potential international spillover
effects. Nine factors are the U.S. variables, namely:
changes of the financial fragility index (FRA) used by
Bagliano and Morana (2012) and summarizing overall
credit conditions, with reference to the corporate, inter-
bank and mortgage markets; the Fama and French
(1993) size and value factors (SMB, HML); the Carhart
(1997) momentum factor (MOM); the stock market
liquidity factor (PSL) proposed by Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003); the leverage factor (LEV) con-
structed by Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014); a risk aver-
sion index (FV) obtained from ameasure of stock return
volatility; changes in the ratio of the U.S. fiscal deficit to
GDP (Fd) and in the ratio of the U.S. trade deficit to
GDP (Td). The remaining two observed factors are the
returns on the real gold price (GD) and on the
International Monetary Fund non-energy commodities
price index (M). Finally, Ot contains 10 observed vari-
ables concerning global oil market demand and supply
conditions, included in order to capture potential effects
of oil market developments on global macroeconomic
and financial quantities.3
Estimation of the global-economy model (1) is
then performed by means of the PC-VAR method
and involves the first 12 PCs of Ft, jointly accounting
for 80% of total variance, and three lags, as suggested
by Monte Carlo results (Morana 2012) and specifi-
cation tests. Hence, 36 parameters are estimated for
each of the 33 equations in the model.4
Identification of structural disturbances
Structural shocks are identified by means of a
Choleski decomposition of the factor innovation
variance–covariance matrix. The chosen recursive
structure of the global factors in Ft is motivated by
plausible assumptions on their relative speed of
adjustment to shocks and theoretical reasoning.
Implementation of the recursive identification strat-
egy yields, for each equation in the global-economy
model, a series of orthogonalized innovations
purged from correlation with all variables placed
before in the ordering and interpreted as underlying
structural economic disturbances. The selected
ordering of the factors in Ft is as reported below:
● oil supply conditions: reserves (R), oil produc-
tion changes (Pp; Pm), refineries margins (RM);
● macroeconomic conditions: employment (E),
unemployment (U), real activity (Y), fiscal pol-
icy stance (G), the U.S. fiscal and trade deficits
(Fd, Td), core inflation (N), real wages (W);
● flow oil demand conditions: oil consumption
(C);
● monetary policy stance and interest rates: excess
liquidity (L), real short-term rate (SR) and term
spread (TS);
● financial conditions I: real housing prices (H),
US$ exchange rate index (X), stock return vola-
tility (FV), Fama–French size and value factors
3The included variables capture various dimensions of oil market dynamics: (i) global oil supply conditions: world oil reserves growth (R), positive (Pp) and
negative (Pm) net world oil production changes, and OECD oil refineries margins growth (RM); (ii) flow oil demand conditions: world oil consumption growth
(C); and (iii) oil futures and spot market conditions: OECD oil inventories growth (INV), real WTI oil price return (OP), changes in nominal WTI oil price volatility
(OV), the 12-month futures basis (FB), and the rate of change of the oil futures market ‘T’ speculation index (WT).
4Given the sample size available, the estimation of an unrestricted VAR(3) model would have been unfeasible, counting 99 parameters for each equation.
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(SMB, HML), Carhart momentum factor
(MOM), Pastor–Stambaugh stock market
liquidity factor (PSL), Adrian–Etula–Muir
leverage factor (LEV);
● oil futures and spot market conditions:
Working-T index (WT), futures market basis
(FB), oil inventories (INV), oil price (OP), oil
price volatility (OV);
● financial conditions II: non-energy commod-
ities price index return (M), stock market
return (F), gold price return (GD), the U.S.
financial fragility index (FRA).
Structural innovations are then grouped into two
broad classes, ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side and
financial’ disturbances, each including shocks coming
from various sources. The main identified sources of
supply-side shocks are oil and (non-energy) commod-
ities markets (OIL), the labour market (LM) and pro-
ductivity dynamics (PR). The identified disturbances
coming from the demand-side and the financial sector
of the economy concern an aggregate demand (AD)
shock to the goods market, a saving rate (SAV) dis-
turbance, a monetary policy stance (MP) shock, a U.S.
terms of trade (TT) shock, a portfolio allocation (PA)
disturbance and some risk factor (RF) disturbances.
Table 1 lists the various categories of shocks and
the corresponding global factor equations from
which orthogonalized innovations are obtained. As
a general caveat, it should be recalled that the inter-
pretation of the results of the forecast error variance
and historical decompositions and the impulse
response analysis in terms of structural economic
and financial shocks may be sensitive to the chosen
ordering of the variables. Since the structural model
implied by the recursive identification scheme is
exactly identified, the assumed contemporaneous
restrictions cannot be tested. However, the reliability
of the identifying assumptions is suggested by the
results of a joint weak exogeneity test, which, though
not providing validation of the set of restrictions at
the system level, strongly supports the implied pair-
wise recursive structure.5
III. Evolving macro-financial dynamics since
the mid-1980s
On the basis of the adopted identification scheme,
the transition from the Great Moderation to the
Great Recession is assessed by looking at historical
decompositions of several variables in the global-
economy model, that allow to disentangle the con-
tributions of the various structural disturbances to
the dynamics of global macro-financial factors on a
quarter by quarter basis. Cumulative historical
decompositions (net of base predictions) are
depicted in Figures 1–3 for selected global variables.
In all plots, dashed lines portray the behaviour of a
Table 1. Identified structural shocks.
Category of shocks (collective
label) Structural interpretation Corresponding global factor(s)
Supply-side disturbances
Oil market (OIL) Oil supply shocks (OS)
Other oil market shocks (OO)
R, Pp, Pm, RM, INV
C, WT, FB, OP, OV
Labour market (LM) Labour supply (LS)
Labour demand (LD)
Unit labour costs (core inflation, CI)
E
U
N
Productivity Productivity shock (PR) W
Commodities market Non-energy commodity price shock (PM) M
Demand-side and financial disturbances
Goods market Aggregate demand (AD) Y
Saving rates (SAV) Global and U.S. saving rate shocks (GFI, GDI, GTI) G, Fd, Td
Monetary policy and
interest rates (MP)
Excess liquidity, short-term rate and term structure slope shocks (EL, TL, TS) L, SR, TS
Foreign exchange market U.S.$ exchange rate shock (terms of trade, TT) X
Portfolio allocation (PA) Preference shocks to housing (PH), stocks (PF), gold (PG) H, F, GD
Risk factors (RF) Size (SZ), value (VL), momentum (MM), stock market liquidity (SL), leverage (LV), uncertainty
(RAV), risk appetite (RAP) shocks
SMB, HML, MOM, PSL, LEV,
FV, FRA
In the table, details about the identified structural shocks (central column) and their originating reduced form equations of the global model (right-hand side
column) are reported.
5The joint weak exogeneity test is based on the Bonferroni bounds principle, and is computed using the 528 possible bivariate tests implied by the recursive
structure involving the 33 variables in the global-economy model. The test does not reject, even at the 20% significance level, the weak exogeneity null
hypothesis (the value of the test is 0.005 to be compared with a 20% critical value equal to 0.0004).
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global factor over the whole 1986–2010 sample, and
solid lines show the contribution of each structural
shock of interest to global factor dynamics. Shaded
areas in the figures correspond to four global reces-
sionary episodes that we identify with protracted
declines in the real activity global factor (Y, see
Figure 1): (i) a recession in the early 1990s (from
1990:2 to 1993:2), following the collapse of the high-
yield market (1989–1990) and the peak of the sav-
ings and loans crisis (1986–1989) in the U.S., the
burst of the real estate bubble in Japan (1989–1991),
the economic crisis in India (1991), the banking
crisis in Finland and Sweden (1991–1993), and the
first Persian Gulf War and the ensuing oil price
shock (1990); (ii) a relatively short downturn in the
late 1990s (1997:3–1998:3), associated with the
financial crisis in East Asia and Russia (1997–
1998); (iii) a recessionary period in the early 2000s
(2000:4–2003:2), following the burst of the dot-com
financial bubble, accounting scandals (2000) and the
11 September terrorist attack (2001) in the U.S., the
economic crisis in Argentina (1999–2002) and the
second Persian Gulf War (started in 2003) and the
related oil price shock; and finally (iv) the Great
Recession (2008:2–2009:3) ignited by the U.S. sub-
prime financial crisis (2007–2009) and the third oil
price shock (2007–2008). Tables 2 and 3 focus on
those four episodes, presenting the contributions of
various categories of structural disturbances to the
overall change of selected global variables in the
detected recessionary periods, as well as in the
four-quarters following recessions.
Real activity and employment
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the dynamics of
global real activity (Y) and employment (E) are
shaped by shocks from all (supply-side, demand-
side and financial) sources over the 1986–2010
sample as a whole. Yet, two sub-periods can be
broadly distinguished with somewhat different
macro-financial features: the first decade of the
sample up to the mid-1990s and the latter part of
the period starting thereof.
Wider fluctuations in the contribution of several
structural disturbances to global output are detected
from the mid-1990s onwards, particularly for pro-
ductivity (PR), goods’ aggregate demand (AD), glo-
bal saving rate (SAV) shocks (Figure 1, first row)
and, to a smaller extent, for shocks to portfolio
allocation (PA) and to the U.S. terms of trade (TT)
(Figure 1, second row). On the other hand, a similar
contribution to global output dynamics across sub-
samples is provided by other structural disturbances,
such as those originated in the labour market (LM,
first row) and the risk factor shocks (RF, second
row). Due to sign compensations, the increased
variability of some important sources of shocks did
not affect the actual volatility of global output until
the recent Great Recession episode and went unno-
ticed in the literature. In fact, many empirical studies
relate the widening in real activity fluctuations to the
2008–2009 recession only (Clark 2009; Canarella
et al. 2010; Chen 2011; Stock and Watson 2012;
Charles, Darné, and Ferrara 2014; Gadea, Gomez-
Loscos, and Pérez-Quiros 2014), whereas our find-
ings point to an increase in volatility of various
important sources of disturbances preceding the
onset of the Great Recession. Moreover, at a more
general level, they also raise the issue of the potential
contribution of financial innovation and liberaliza-
tion to macroeconomic instability, as the widening
in real activity fluctuations associated with produc-
tivity, portfolio allocation and aggregate demand
disturbances might be related to changes in the
financial structure of the global economy.6 They
also question somewhat the ‘good luck’ explanation
of the Great Moderation, due to the changing con-
tribution of productivity shocks to output volatility,
as well as oil market shocks contributing more to
trend than cyclical output dynamics. Global employ-
ment fluctuations show a broadly similar, though
less clear-cut, pattern across sub-periods (Figure 2),
with saving rate shocks and (to a lesser extent)
productivity disturbances displaying a larger varia-
bility since the mid-1990s, in contrast to risk factor
and labour market shocks.
Global recessionary episodes
Focusing on global recessionary periods, several
additional features of real activity and employment
fluctuations can be noted in Panel A and B of
6Gorton and Ordonez (2014) present a model where a credit cycle is initially sustained by a productivity growth revival, subsequently dampened as
productivity advances fade away. Indeed, the timing of the 1996–2004 U.S. productivity growth revival (2.9% yearly on average; Gordon 2012) is consistent
with a link between productivity dynamics and the ensuing financial crisis.
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Table 2. Overall, demand-side and financial shocks
account for the bulk of output declines during all
recessions from the mid-1980s. In the 2000–2003
recession, they determine a drop of −5.3% out of
an overall decrease in output of −6.9% (last column
of Panel A), and explain −9.3% of the −15.4% output
decline during the 2008–2009 Great Recession. A
similar observation applies to global employment,
for which demand-side and financial shocks account
for −14% out of an overall −18% decline in the early
1990s contraction and −7.3% out of −10.6% in the
Great Recession period. However, supply-side dis-
turbances become more relevant for global output
fluctuations since the late 1990s, explaining −1.5%
and −6% of real activity drops in the early 2000s and
Great Recession periods, respectively. This result is
mostly attributable to a different role played by
productivity shocks across recessions, partially dam-
pening the contractionary effects of demand-side
disturbances in the two recessions of the 1990s and
sizably contributing to deepen the output drop in the
2000s episodes. Oil market shocks provided a rela-
tively limited contribution to all recessions (e.g.
explaining only −0.5% of the −15% drop in global
output in 2008–2009), but imparted a persistent
downward trend in real activity from the mid-
1990s (Figure 1, first row).
The identification strategy adopted here allows
also to uncover similarities between the recent
Great Recession and some of the previous contrac-
tionary episodes in terms of their main structural
driving forces. In both the 2008–2009 and the early
1990s recessions, shocks originated in the financial
sector of the economy played a remarkable role in
determining output and employment drops.
Portfolio allocation shocks (PA) sizably contributed
to both recessions, accounting for around −2%/−3%
of actual declines in output and employment,
whereas disturbances related to the monetary policy
stance (MP) had a larger impact in the 1990–1993
contraction, when they can explain some −3.8% and
−4.2% drops in output and employment, respec-
tively. Conversely, innovations to risk factors (RF),
signalling changes in investors’ expectations and risk
attitudes, gave a more substantial contribution in the
Great Recession, accounting for −2% of the output
and −2.5% of the employment fall. Within the latter
category of disturbances, size (SZ) and leverage (LV)
shocks were the most relevant determinants. Overall,
those results can be understood by noting that the
early 1990s and the 2008–2009 recessions share a
broadly similar boom–bust credit cycle origin,
rooted in the savings and loans and in the sub-
prime mortgage market crisis, respectively, as well
as deep contractions in asset prices (see below). They
are also consistent with Stock and Watson (2012),
pointing to a more sizable contribution to the depth
of the Great Recession by financial disturbances
rather than oil market shocks. Our global perspec-
tive, however, provides evidence of the relevance of
disturbances from a broader range of sources,
including productivity, the labour market, portfolio
allocation choices and risk factor measures.
Global jobless recoveries
Table 2 also shows the contribution of various struc-
tural shocks to global output and employment fluc-
tuations in the first four-quarters of the recoveries
following each recession. Several features are worth
mentioning. Concerning real activity (Panel A), all
recoveries, with the only partial exception of the
1997–1998 episode, are mainly driven by supply-
side forces, with demand-side and financial shocks
having an offsetting effect in the two most recent
recessions, providing a −0.3%/−0.4% contribution to
relatively mild output expansions of around 0.5%.
Global employment (Panel B) displays reductions
not only in the year following the Great Recession
(−1.5%) but also during the recoveries occurred after
the early 1990s and the early 2000s contractions
(amounting to −1.4% and −0.5%, respectively).7
The latter results are notable since they document
that the ‘jobless recovery’ phenomenon, so far
detected for the U.S. economy only (Groshen and
Potter 2003; Camacho, Perez-Quiros, and
Mendizabal 2011; Kolesnikova and Liu 2011), has
an important global dimension, and extends back
to (at least) the early 1990s. According to our struc-
tural historical decomposition, both supply-side and
demand-side/financial driving forces account for the
jobless recovery episodes, the latter disturbances
showing the larger contribution. In the aftermath
7The exception to this pattern is the recovery after the 1997–1998 recession, during which employment rose by 3.8%. However, from the perspective of
global employment, the whole late-1990s episode displays peculiar features, since even during the recession period employment actually rose by 4.6% in
the face of a contraction of global output of 2.8%.
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of the Great Recession, portfolio allocation shocks
and, within the risk factor category, innovations to
the leverage factor were the most relevant financial
structural determinants, whereas among supply-side
influences, productivity disturbances (−0.4%) and
labour market shocks (−0.7%), sizably contributed
to the jobless recovery. Relative to Stock and Watson
(2012), who argue that the jobless recovery from the
Great Recession in the U.S. was caused mostly by a
slowing down in trend labour force growth, our
results, based on a finer identification of structural
shocks, describe a more composite picture, pointing
also to productivity and financial shocks (−1.3%) as
significant determinants of the jobless recovery
phenomenon.
Global imbalances, liquidity and financial markets
We now turn to a discussion of the main determi-
nants of fluctuations in additional important U.S.
and global macroeconomic and financial variables
and to the analysis of the developments leading to
the onset of the recent financial crisis and Great
Recession. Our results point to tight relationships
between the buildup of global imbalances, the global
monetary policy stance and liquidity conditions and
fluctuations in risk factors and asset prices. The
overall picture is broadly consistent with the expla-
nation of the deep origins and main mechanisms
underlying the recent crisis and ensuing recession
provided by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas
(2008a, 2008b), that we adopt as an organizing fra-
mework to discuss our evidence. According to this
account, three phases can be distinguished in macro-
financial dynamics since the late 1990s. The pre-
crisis period is characterized by the building up of
global external imbalances and a ‘savings glut’ phe-
nomenon, with a global excess demand for safe
assets, directing capital flows from emerging markets
to the U.S. This reallocation of capital flows contrib-
uted to maintain low U.S. and world real interest
rates, reinforcing the expansionary effects of the
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, and fuelled a
boom in the U.S. housing and related credit markets,
putting pressure on the securitization mechanism,
that eventually broke down in early 2007 in the
face of falling house prices. The first stage of the
crisis, from mid-2007 through mid-2008, is then
marked by the freezing of the entire securitization
industry, vanishing confidence and pervasive flights
to quality, creating even more pressure on the provi-
sion of safe financial assets. The ensuing deteriora-
tion of balance sheets forced financial institutions
into deleveraging and fire sales of assets, transmit-
ting the negative house price shock to the U.S. and
world stock markets, that experienced a sharp con-
traction through early 2009. At the same time, dri-
ven by fast growth in emerging economies and
portfolio allocation effects, oil as well as other com-
modity prices rose considerably, even accelerating
their pace from mid-2007 to mid-2008. Finally, the
second phase of the crisis, from mid-2008 to mid-
2009, is characterized by the real effects of the finan-
cial turmoil, the bursting of the oil and non-energy
commodity price bubbles and the ensuing decline in
global real activity. A sequence of asset price mis-
alignments, migrating over time from bond to hous-
ing, credit, stock and oil and non-energy commodity
markets, is then a distinguishing feature of the
2000s. In what follows, we will focus first on global
imbalances and monetary policy conditions, and
then on the dynamics of asset prices.
The ‘savings glut’, the Great Deviation and the Great
Leveraging
Several results broadly consistent with the proposed
account of the main macro-financial developments
leading to the recent financial and economic crisis
are delivered by the historical decomposition of key
variables, namely the U.S. trade deficit to GDP ratio
(Td), global excess liquidity (L), the leverage factor
(LEV) and the U.S. exchange rate return index (X).
The pre-crisis period is indeed characterized by the
building up of global external imbalances, as the
deterioration in the U.S. current account deficit
(shown as the dashed line in Figure 3, first row),
while ongoing since 1991, rapidly worsened in 1998
in the aftermath of the East Asia financial crisis, and
again in 2000 following the burst of the dot-com
bubble. Consistent with the ‘savings glut’ hypothesis
and the pre-crisis scenario envisaged by Caballero,
Farhi and Gourinchas (2008b), the worsening in the
U.S. trade balance since the late 1990s is largely
explained by global non-U.S. saving rate shocks
(GTI), as well as oil market disturbances (OIL), due
to the potential impact of oil price dynamics on the
U.S. trade balance. Yet, while OIL negatively affected
trade balance conditions over the whole time span
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considered, since 2006 saving rate disturbances actu-
ally contributed to its improvement, reflecting a shift
away from the U.S. housing market-related securities
by international investors. Moreover, both innova-
tions in the global monetary policy stance (MP) and
risk factor disturbances (RF) deepened the U.S. trade
imbalance since the early 2000s, while portfolio allo-
cation shifts (PA) and terms of trade shocks (TT)
had a partially offsetting effect. The worsening of Td
determined by monetary policy shocks accords with
the basic mechanism of the international risk-taking
channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu 2012;
Bruno and Shin 2015): over-expansionary U.S.
monetary policy caused a contraction in perceived
risk and funding costs, fuelling asset prices and the
net worth of financial institutions, as well as their
leverage and risk-taking attitude, resulting in capital
inflows into the U.S. and depreciation of the US$.
The increase in global excess liquidity (L)
occurred since the mid-1990s (Figure 3, second
row, dashed line) is accounted for by shocks origi-
nated in the oil and labour markets (LM), reflecting
the countercyclical use of monetary policy in OECD
countries since the 1980s (Sutherland 2010) and in
some emerging economies following the sub-prime
financial crisis (McGettingan et al. 2013), while
shocks to risk factors (RF), productivity (PR) and
goods’ aggregate demand (AD, shown together in
the second row, last plot) have moderated global
excess liquidity creation. Feedback effects from
asset prices to excess liquidity generation are
detected through the contributions of portfolio allo-
cation shocks (mostly due to housing and stock
preferences) to global liquidity dynamics, as well as
the relevance of leverage-credit spirals unrelated to
fundamentals through the contribution of the (own)
leverage shock to financial leverage fluctuations.
Moreover, the existence of a linkage between global
excess demand for safe assets and excess risk-taking
by the U.S. financial institutions, and the relevance
of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy, are
supported by the sizable contribution of global sav-
ing rate and monetary policy disturbances to lever-
age fluctuations. Overall, the above features are
consistent with the Great Deviation and Great
Leveraging hypotheses, pointing to an empirically
relevant relationship between global excess liquidity
creation, excessive risk-taking and boom–bust asset
price cycles over the time span investigated.
Additional supporting evidence is provided by
behaviour of Td and L during and after recessionary
episodes, shown in Table 3. The ‘savings glut’
hypothesis can explain the worsening of the U.S.
trade deficit (Panel A) in the late 1990s and early
2000s recessions (by 0.9% and 0.6%, respectively),
with a considerable contribution of global saving
shocks (SAV) during the former episode (1%).
Such disturbances also played a significant role in
the Great Recession, contributing by −0.7% to the
−2.3% improvement in the U.S. trade deficit, along
with other financial shocks, mainly related to the
global monetary policy stance and portfolio alloca-
tion shifts. Excess liquidity (L, Panel B) remarkably
increased during the Great Recession (10.6%), lar-
gely driven by demand-side (6.8%), and especially
global monetary policy disturbances (MP, 2.3%), due
to widespread generous countercyclical policies.
Similarly, L increased, though by smaller amounts,
in the late 1990s (3.8%) and early 2000s (0.8%)
recessions, but in those episodes mostly driven by
supply-side shocks. Finally, the deep contraction in
the financial leverage factor LEV during the Great
Recession (−60.4%) is a clear-cut distinguishing fea-
ture from previous recessionary episodes, mostly
accounted for by financial shocks, particularly risk
factor and uncertainty disturbances.
Asset price dynamics
Shocks to global saving rates are also responsible for
the downward shift in global real short-term rates
from the mid-1990s, as predicted by the ‘savings
glut’ hypothesis, while global monetary policy dis-
turbances contributed to maintain a low interest rate
environment. From the early 2000s, also risk factor
shocks, related to investors’ misperceptions of actual
macro-financial risk, contributed importantly to the
short-rate downward path. According to the ‘migrat-
ing bubble’ narrative, the excess demand for safe
assets, directed to the U.S. bond market since the
late 1990s, partially shifted over time to the housing
and stock markets and eventually moved to com-
modity markets. The historical decomposition of
global real house (H) and stock price (F) factors
portrayed in Figure 3 (third and last rows) broadly
accords with this reading. The house price cycle
started in the late 1990s is mostly driven by distur-
bances to portfolio allocation preferences (PA), espe-
cially housing preference shocks (PH), consistent
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with shifts in investors’ preferences in favour of the
housing market and with a growing fad component
in house prices as well. Some of the main driving
forces of movements in short rates also sizably
affected house prices over both the boom and bust
cyclical phases. Shocks to global monetary policy
contributed to the surge in H up to 2003, as well as
to its stabilization until 2008, and decline thereafter.
Disturbances to global savings rates and risk factors
drove house prices upward since 2003 and then
downward since 2007. Moreover, consistent with
shifts in investors’ preferences in favour of stocks
taking place as profit opportunities in the housing
market were fading away, PA sizably accounts for
the rise in stock prices over the 2003–2007 period.
In addition to portfolio allocation shifts, other fac-
tors played a role in shaping the stock price cycle. In
accordance with the ‘savings glut’ hypothesis and the
evidence for house prices, global saving rate shocks
drove F upward since the early 2000s, and then down-
ward during the Great Recession; on the other hand,
productivity disturbances (PR) imparted a downward
trend to stock prices over the entire time span. The
latter effect, occurred in a period of growing produc-
tivity, is broadly consistent with a Shumpeterian view
of innovation as a process of creative destruction, as
suggested by Kogan et al. (2012), and with the out-
come of efficiency gains in production.
Focusing on the Great Recession episode, the
contraction in housing prices started in early 2007
led to the break down of the securitization industry.
The deterioration of the U.S. financial institutions’
balance sheets then forced them into deleveraging
and sharp asset sales, transmitting the negative
house price shock first to stock markets, and then
to commodity markets. A sizable contraction in
stock prices occurred from 2007:4 to 2009:1, while
non-energy commodity prices declined only over the
period 2008:3–2009:1. As the financial crisis turned
into an economic crisis, the downturn in global real
activity (2008:1–2009:2) drove down the demand for
oil and commodities, amplifying the negative finan-
cial shock and eventually bursting the oil and com-
modity price bubbles. Table 3 confirms that the
decline in asset prices during the Great Recession
was generalized, yet particularly sizable for house
(−12.7%, Panel D) and commodity prices (−27.6%,
Panel E), and driven by a wide array of macroeco-
nomic (supply-side and demand-side) and financial
shocks. Some similarities between the Great
Recession and the early 1990s episode can be
noted, consistent with their analogous boom–bust
credit cycle origin, while asset prices behaviour dur-
ing the late 1990s and early 2000s episodes are more
heterogeneous. The effects of shocks during the
Great Recession were however larger than in the
early 1990s contraction in the case of house prices
(−7.6% in 1990–1993) and commodity prices
(−16%), whereas the overall drop in stock prices
was more pronounced in the early 1990s recession.
Among individual sources of disturbances for asset
prices, a significant contribution of global monetary
policy and portfolio allocation disturbances to house
and commodity price fluctuations is observed in all
recessionary episodes.
IV. The end of the Great Moderation?
An important conclusion that can be drawn from
our study is that the Great Moderation and the Great
Recession were not two unrelated events. In this
section we provide further evidence against the
‘end of the Great Moderation’ view by means of an
out-of-sample forecasting exercise. In particular, we
show that the Great Recession would have been
predictable along the timing, though not the size
dimension by conditioning on information already
available over the Great Moderation period. This
finding is then consistent with the view that the
same macroeconomic mechanisms prevailing during
the Great Moderation also persisted through the
Great Recession, yet with much larger shocks hitting
the macroeconomy.
Our forecasting exercise is implemented by recur-
sive estimation of the econometric model in (1–2)
and the associated structural innovations. The latter
are then employed in various forecasting models, in
order to assess the incremental gain in predicting
power yielded by their inclusion, relative to past
information, on real activity measures for the global
economy, the U.S. and the Euro area.
Indeed, the results presented in the previous sec-
tion point to a remarkable contribution of shocks to
a large set of risk factors in shaping fluctuations of
global macroeconomic and financial variables over
the whole sample. Due to our identification strategy,
those disturbances are all orthogonal to past and
current changes in global macroeconomic factors,
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oil supply, the global monetary policy stance and
interest rate movements. Therefore, they are able to
capture changes in investors’ expectations and risk
attitudes in a more complete fashion and are also
likely to show ‘early warning’ or ‘forward looking’
properties for mounting macro-financial imbalances.
Forecasting models are specified by means of a
general-to-specific econometric approach and esti-
mated over the sample 1986:1–2008:1. Out of sample
one-step (quarter)-ahead predictions are then gener-
ated over the period 2008:2 through 2010:3 without
updating the model’s parameter estimates, which
makes our forecasting exercise more challenging.
The analysis is carried out in two steps, focusing
first on the predictability of the timing of the real
downturn and the following recovery, and then on
the magnitude of real activity fluctuations. In the
first step, the variable to be predicted is the prob-
ability of a recession to occur, simply measured by a
dummy variable taking an unitary value during
recessions and zero elsewhere. For robustness, pre-
dictability is assessed with reference not only to the
global output factor (Y) but also to the U.S. and the
Euro area output growth rates.8 Results are pre-
sented in Table 4 and Figure 4 (left column). The
Table shows, for each real activity measure (Y,
GDPUS and GDPEA), a benchmark autoregressive
model (OD) and the best performing dynamic mod-
els augmented with lagged structural shocks to var-
ious risk factors (OD X, OD X1 and OD X2)
estimated on 1986:4–2008:1. The one-quarter-ahead
out-of-sample predictions are then generated over
the period 2008:2–2010:3 and the forecasting perfor-
mance of the models is assessed. The gain in fore-
casting power obtained by the augmented models is
remarkable irrespective of the metric employed
(RMSE, MAFE and TIC), showing reductions ran-
ging from 50% to 90% of the corresponding forecast
error measure for the benchmark autoregressive spe-
cification. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4, the
improvement in forecasting performance yielded by
risk factor innovations stems from their ability to
accurately signal the beginning (2008:2 for global
output and Euro area GDP growth, and 2008:3 for
the U.S. GDP growth) and the end of the economic
downturn (especially 2009:4 for global output), as
well as the further decline in global real activity
occurred at the end of the sample in 2010:3. In
contrast, standard dynamic models fail to accurately
predict both events.
In the second step we specify forecasting models
augmented with structural risk factor innovations
directly for the actual rates of change of the global
output factor and the U.S. and Euro area GDP. This
allows to assess the predictability of the magnitude of
real activity fluctuations over the 2008:2–2010:3 period,
and of the depth of the Great Recession in particular.
As shown in Table 5 and Figure 4 (right column), a
30–60% improvement in forecasting accuracy, depend-
ing on metric and target variable, is obtained by means
of (asymmetric) augmented models, conditioned on
censored (according to sign) risk factor innovations.
In particular, a 40–60% contraction in RMSFE, MAFE
and TIC figures is obtained for the U.S. and Euro area
GDP growth models, while for global real activity
growth the improvement is about 30%.
Overall, two main conclusions can be drawn. First,
the timing of economic downturn and recovery fol-
lowing the financial crisis cannot be accurately pre-
dicted by standard dynamic models, conditioned on
own relevant information only. Predictions are greatly
improved when models are augmented with informa-
tion contained in past risk factor structural innova-
tions. Second, the magnitude of output fluctuations
and the depth of the Great Recession cannot be
accurately predicted even by the factor innovations-
augmented autoregressive models. Both findings are
consistent with the in-sample results, showing that
the Great Recession was peculiar for its depth, rather
than for its mechanics, and therefore predictable
along the timing, but not the size dimension. We
interpret the latter results as evidence against the
‘end of the Great Moderation’ view.
V. Conclusions
This article contributes to the literature on the siz-
able dampening of global macroeconomic fluctua-
tions occurred since the mid-1980s, dubbed the
Great Moderation, yielding new insights on its struc-
tural features, as well as on the process leading to the
Great Recession. Grounded on the view that those
8We consider the U.S. economy to be in recession in the 2008:3–2009:2 period. In 2008:2 U.S. output actually increased by an annual rate of 2% over the
previous quarter.
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phenomena share an important global dimension
and are tightly related, we employ a large-scale,
global-economy econometric model to identify
structural macroeconomic and financial global fac-
tors as driving forces of observed fluctuations. A
second distinctive feature of our approach is the
introduction of a comprehensive array of risk factor
indicators in the estimated model. Structural innova-
tions in the latter variables are interpreted as com-
plementary signals of revisions in investors’
expectations and risk attitudes, with a potential role
as early warning indicators of upcoming real activity
downturns.
Our results show that observed macro-financial
dynamics over the 1986–2010 period were the out-
come of a composite set of disturbances coming
from all (demand-side, supply-side and financial)
sources, and cannot be associated only with subdued
productivity and oil shocks and improved monetary
policy management. Moreover, macroeconomic
fluctuations do not show the same features over the
whole Great Moderation, as heterogeneity in terms
of amplitude and determinants are detected, in con-
trast to the existing literature, well before the onset
of the Great Recession. In fact, much wider real
fluctuations are detected from the mid-1990s,
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Figure 4. Actual and predicted recession probabilities and real activity/GDP growth.
In the Figure actual and forecast values for recession probabilities (left-hand side plots) and global real activity (Y) and GDP growth
rates (right-hand side plots) are plotted over the period 2008:2–2010:3. Top panels report results for the global economy, center
panels for the U.S., bottom panels for the Euro area. In the left-hand side plots, actual recession periods are highlighted by shaded
bars: 2008:2–2009:3 (and 2010:3) for the global-economy output; 2008:3–2009:2 for the U.S.; 2008:2–2009:2 for the Euro area. The
0.5 probability demarcation value is denoted by the horizontal dotted line. Forecasts generated by the own-dynamics autoregres-
sive model (OD), the own-dynamic autoregressive model augmented by lagged global real activity growth (OD-X1, for the U.S. and
the Euro area) and lagged structural innovations (OD-X for global activity, and OD-X2 for the U.S. and the Euro area) are reported
using dashed, dotted and solid lines, respectively. Forecasting models are specified as in Tables 4–5. In the right-hand side plots the
actual figures are denoted by dashed lines; forecasts generated by the autoregressive model (AR), the autoregressive model
augmented by lagged global real activity (AR-X1) and by lagged structural innovations (AR-X2) are denoted by dotted and solid
lines. Forecasting models are specified as in Tables 4–5.
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determined by productivity, goods’ aggregate
demand and global saving rate shocks, as well as
portfolio allocation and the U.S. terms of trade dis-
turbances. In this perspective, the late 2000s finan-
cial crisis and economic contraction were the
eventual outcome of an already ongoing process,
determined by both macroeconomic and financial
disturbances, broadly consistent with the account
provided by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas
(2008b).
Our findings also point to the ‘savings glut’ view
of the buildup of global imbalances (Bernanke 2005),
the ‘Great Deviation’ hypothesis on the global mone-
tary policy stance (Taylor 2013) and the ‘Great
Leveraging’ view about financial intermediaries’
risk-taking behaviour (Taylor 2012) as complemen-
tary explanations of the transition dynamics leading
to the Great Recession. Misalignments in asset prices
also appear to have migrated from bond to housing
and credit markets since the early 2000s, and then to
stock and commodity markets following the contrac-
tion in house prices since 2007.
Peculiar to the Great Recession was the much larger
magnitude of shocks rather than their source, and the
size of the global real activity contraction, which was
(on average per quarter) four times larger than during
the previous three episodes. Demand-side and finan-
cial shocks account for about two-thirds of the −15%
drop in global output over the 2008:2–2009:3 period,
with disturbances to portfolio allocation and innova-
tions to risk factors playing a substantial role. The
overall evidence is then consistent with the narrative
pointing to the real effects of the sub-prime financial
crisis working mainly through aggregate demand
shortages, due to a credit crunch, an increased level
of uncertainty and larger precautionary savings.
Our results also points to similarities between recov-
eries following recessionary episodes. In particular, we
find that the ‘jobless recovery’ phenomenon is not lim-
ited to the aftermath of the Great Recession but extends
back to at least the early 1990s recession and displays an
important global dimension, previously unnoticed in
the literature. In this respect, our findings cast some
doubts on a purely structural explanation of this phe-
nomenon. In fact, demand-side and financial shocks
(particularly portfolio allocation, terms of trade and
risk factor), in addition to accounting for as much as
cyclical employment variance than supply-side (produc-
tivity and labour market) disturbances over the whole
sample, had an even larger slowing down effect in the
year following the end of the Great Recession.
Finally, by means of an out-of-sample forecasting
exercise we provide evidence against the ‘end of the
Great Moderation’ view. In fact, we find that dynamic
models augmented with lagged risk factor innovations
could have accurately predicted the timing of the cycli-
cal downturn and upturn in the global-economy output
factor and in the U.S. and Euro area GDP growth. Yet,
the magnitude of output fluctuations and the depth of
the Great Recession cannot be accurately predicted even
by the factor innovations-augmented autoregressive
models. Both findings are consistent with the in-sample
results, showing that the Great Recession was peculiar
for its depth, due to the size of the shocks, but featured
the same macroeconomic mechanisms at work also
during the Great Moderation period.
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